

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00
ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00
OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15
USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /089 W
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P 061630Z JUL 77
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2254
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0371

FROM MBFR REP

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM NATO
SUBJ: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES OF JULY 5, 1977

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN THE JULY 5, 1977 INFORMAL SESSION OF THE VIENNA TALKS, THE ALLIES WERE REPRESENTED BY THE NETHERLANDS REP, UK REP AND US REP, AND THE EAST BY SOVIET REPS TARASOV AND SHUSTOV, GDR REP OESER AND POLISH REP DABROWA. MILITARY ADVISORS ALSO PARTICIPATED.

2. THE MEETING CONTAINED SOME INTERESTING INDIVIDUAL POINTS. EASTERN REPS GAVE LENGTHY ACCOUNT OF EASTERN VIEWS ON PHASE I REDUCTION COMMITMENTS BY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND USSR, ASKING QUESTIONS ABOUT WESTERN VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT. EASTERN REPS MADE STATEMENTS ON DATA EXCHANGE, PRESSING THE WEST TO TABLE NATIONAL TOTALS, ANSWERED SOME WESTERN
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QUESTIONS ON EASTERN DATA AND ASKED FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT WESTERN DATA ON FORCES OF NATO PARTICIPANTS. WESTERN REPS RESPONDED TO EASTERN ARGUMENTS FOR AIR FORCE REDUCTIONS IN JUNE 28 INFORMAL BY EXPLAINING REASONS FOR WESTERN STRESS ON GROUND FORCES. THEY ANSWERED EASTERN QUESTIONS ON WESTERN DATA AND ASKED FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT EASTERN DATA. THEY CITED FURTHER EXAMPLES OF INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN PAST EASTERN STATEMENTS

AND PRESENT EASTERN CLAIMS THAT THERE IS NEAR PARITY OF MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THEY STRESSED THE NEED TO CONTINUE THE DATA EXCHANGE UNTIL THE REASONS FOR DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WESTERN AND EASTERN FIGURES ON WARSAW PACT MILITARY MANPOWER HAD BEEN CLARIFIED.

3. NETHERLANDS REP PRESENTED WESTERN CASE FOR FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES. THE PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF INSTABILITY IN THE REDUCTION AREA WAS NOT AIR FORCES, BUT THE VERY LARGE NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY WHICH THE EAST HAD IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND IN TANKS. AIR FORCES, INCLUDING THEIR SUPPORTING UNITS AND EQUIPMENT, COULD BE EASILY AND RAPIDLY RETURNED TO THE REDUCTION AREA. GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS WERE, THEREFORE, MOST SIGNIFICANT. MOREOVER, REDUCTION OF AIR FORCES WOULD RESULT IN CONTRACTUALIZATION OF EASTERN NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN AIRCRAFT.

4. GDR REP ADDRESSED WESTERN QUESTION FROM JUNE 21 INFORMAL AS TO THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE STAGE 1 COMMITMENTS THE EAST EXPECTED FROM THE US AND USSR ON THE ONE HAND AND FROM OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ACCORDING TO ITS FEBRUARY 1976 PROPOSAL. HE SAID CENTRAL ISSUE WAS THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD IN A FIRST AGREEMENT ASSUME CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS FOR THEIR REDUCTIONS. OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY US AND USSR WOULD CONTAIN SPECIFIC DETAILS OF THEIR PHASE I REDUCTIONS. COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD ONLY BE FOR THE
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SCOPE AND TIMING OF THEIR PHASE II REDUCTIONS. CONTINUATION OF OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY US AND USSR IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD DEPEND ON IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE II REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. AGREEMENT ON A FIRST PHASE WOULD BE THE "PROTOTYPE" OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSEQUENT REDUCTIONS. HOWEVER, THE CONTENT OF AN AGREEMENT ON SECOND PHASE WOULD HAVE ITS OWN SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS WHICH SHOULD BE LEFT OPEN FOR NEGOTIATION AT THAT TIME. ALTHOUGH THE EAST HAD PRESENTED ITS OWN GENERAL APPROACH TO A SECOND PHASE, IT DID NOT DEMAND THAT THIS APPROACH BE STIPULATED IN THE FIRST REDUCTION AGREEMENT. IF THE WEST HAD BETTER SOLUTIONS ENSURING FORCE REDUCTIONS BY ALL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, THE EAST WAS READY TO DEAL WITH THESE SUGGESTIONS NOW.

5. GDR REP ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT WESTERN POSITION ON PHASE I COMMITMENTS INCLUDING: (1) WERE NATO COUNTRIES READY TO STATE UNDER THEIR OWN REDUCTION APPROACH HOW MANY FORCES EACH COUNTRY WOULD REDUCE OR WOULD THIS QUESTION BE SETTLED BY THE NATO BLOC ITSELF? (2) WERE NATO COUNTRIES READY TO INDICATE THE TIMING OF REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES IN THE SECOND PHASE UNDER THE WESTERN REDUCTION SCHEME? (3) GIVEN THE WESTERN TENDENCY TO TRY

TO SETTLE EVERYTHING IN THE FIRST PHASE WHAT ACCORDING TO WESTERN
VIEWS WOULD BE THE SUBJECT MATTER OF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS?

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FROM MBFR REP

6. IN ENSUING DIALOG, TARASOV EXPLAINED THAT THE WORD "SCOPE"
IN THE EASTERN COMMITMENT FORMULA FROM VIEWPOINT OF EASTERN APPROACH
MEANT EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS, IN UNITS, WITH THEIR ARMAMENTS.

7. US REP ANSWERED EASTERN QUESTIONS ABOUT WESTERN DATA RAISED
IN JUNE 28 SESSION AND ASKED FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT EASTERN
DATA. US REP CITED EASTERN STATEMENTS OF 1974 AND 1975 WHICH
INDICATED THAT EASTERN REPS AT THAT TIME CONSIDERED THAT THE
EAST HAD NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN MANPOWER AND MADE CLEAR THE
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN PRESENT EASTERN CLAIMS THAT THERE WAS NEAR
PARITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER ON BOTH SIDES IN THE AREA WITH THESE
EARLIER EASTERN STATEMENTS.

8. POLISH REP DEALT WITH DATA ISSUE. HE CLAIMED WESTERN ANSWERS
TO EASTERN QUESTIONS MADE CLEAR THAT THE WEST HAD NOT HAD
AVAILABLE THE SAME TYPE OF INFORMATION FOR ITS FIGURES ON
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WARSAW PACT TROOPS AS FOR ITS COUNT OF NATO FORCES, THAT WEST WAS THEREFORE USING DIFFERENT COUNTING METHODS FOR THE FORCES ON EACH SIDE. THE WEST HAD OVER-ESTIMATED THE SIZE OF WARSAW PACT FORCES. WEST HAD ADVANCED NO PROOF FOR ITS CONTENTION OF AN EASTERN NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY. NOR HAD WEST ADVANCED ANY EXPLANATION FOR ITS FAILURE TO TABLE NATIONAL DATA.

9. POLISH REP ARGUED ADVANTAGES OF TABLING NATIONAL DATA. TABLING OF NATIONAL FIGURES WOULD PROVIDE BASIS FOR MORE RATIONAL ALLOCATION BETWEEN GROUND AND AIR FORCES, A POINT ON WHICH EAST/WEST AGREEMENT WOULD BE NEEDED. THE PRESENT PHASE OF DATA DISCUSSION WAS NOW IN PRACTICE DEALING WITH EXCLUSIONS FROM THE ARMED FORCES OF INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS WHILE THE WEST REFUSED TO AGREE TO EXCHANGE DATA ON THESE FORCES. TABLING OF NATIONAL DATA WOULD ENABLE PARTICIPANTS TO DISCUSS THE MANNING LEVELS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS. TABLING NATIONAL DATA WOULD FACILITATE FINDING THE SOURCE OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN DATA AND ENABLE PARTICIPANTS TO FOCUS ON THE AREA OF GREATEST DISCREPANCY. DISCUSSION OF NATIONAL DATA COULD BEGIN WITH DISCUSSION OF US AND SOVIET FIGURES. DISCUSSION OF DATA ON NATIONAL FORCES COULD BE UNDERTAKEN ONLY UNDER TWO STRICTLY MAINTAINED CONDITIONS: (1) THE DISCUSSION MUST NOT INFRINGE ON THE REDUCTION APPROACH OF EITHER SIDE; (2) ATTEMPTS MUST BE EXCLUDED TO GO BEYOND QUESTIONS WHICH WERE MEANINGFUL FOR SOLUTION OF REDUCTION PROBLEMS INTO THE ISSUE OF ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE OF THE FORCES.

10. UK REP RESPONDED TO REMARKS CONCERNING THE DATA EXCHANGE PROCESS MADE BY GDR REP IN JUNE 28 INFORMAL SESSION. THE FACT THAT WESTERN FIGURES SHOWED THAT THE WEST HAD A NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY OF WELL OVER 150,000 MEN IN THE REDUCTION AREA WAS NOT THE OBSTACLE TO AGREEMENT ON DATA BUT THE FACT THAT EASTERN

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FIGURES WERE INCOMPLETE. WESTERN FIGURES ON EASTERN FORCES WERE NEITHER ARBITRARY NOR INVENTED BUT THE PRODUCT OF ACCUMULATED INFORMATION AND INTENSIVE ANALYSIS. WESTERN FIGURES FOR THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE MILITARY MANPOWER OF THE EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE BASED ON THE SAME RULES OF EXCLUSIONS AND INCLUSIONS AS WEST HAD USED TO COMPUTE MILITARY MANPOWER OF WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. WHAT WAS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, WAS WHETHER UNDER THESE CATEGORIES, THE EAST HAD ALSO NOT EXCLUDED SOME PERSONNEL WHICH THE WEST WOULD CONSIDER ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL. RESULTS OF DATA DISCUSSION SO FAR HAD BEEN INCONCLUSIVE BUT THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO CONTINUING THIS DISCUSSION. EASTERN REPS HAD IN EFFECT SUGGESTED THAT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD

COME TO AGREEMENT BY OVERLOOKING DISPARITIES SHOWN BY WESTERN DATA. THIS WAS NOT AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. NEITHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS NOR WESTERN PARLIAMENTARY OR PUBLIC OPINION WOULD ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF DELIBERATELY IGNORING THE EXISTENCE OF A LARGE EASTERN NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER. BEFORE PARTICIPANTS COULD REACH THE AGREEMENT ON DATA WHICH WAS NECESSARY FOR CALCULATING REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS, THE REASON FOR THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN FIGURES WOULD HAVE TO BE CLARIFIED.

11. TARASOV SAID IF WEST HAD DOUBTS ABOUT EASTERN FIGURES, IT SHOULD ACCELERATE THE DISCUSSION BY PRODUCING PROOF THAT EASTERN FIGURES WERE WRONG. UP TO NOW, IT HAD NOT DONE SO NOR HAD THE WEST PUT FORWARD ANY CONSTRUCTIVE COUNTER PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE CONDUCT OF THE DATA DISCUSSION. THE EAST HAD NOT EXCLUDED ANY ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL UNDER THE HEADING OF BORDER GUARDS OR INTERNAL SECURITY. EASTERN AND WESTERN VIEWS ON EXCLUSION OF BORDER GUARDS AND INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES SEEMED TO COINCIDE. END SUMMARY. RESOR

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